We find commonalities in judging attitudes, construing ambiguous sentences, and IMF. While adults use incomplete information to impose construals, infants use expression to manufacture both sensitivity to circumstances and motivated action. Value-laden dynamics augment the infant's cognitive powers as IMF channels experience towards future action. While IMF gives infants increasing self control, adults use semantic syntheses to partition the world. In using dynamics, adults settle on a judgement (e.g. unfriendly) and thus mimic users of artificial codes. Far from using invertable rule-based processes (or invariant cues), it is much more likely that the events use the brain's constructed standards. As Spurrett and Cowley (2004) argue, verbal understanding emerges as abstraction amenable behaviour. Dynamics, just as in adults, prompt norm-based preferences that motivate action. Eventually babies come to feel that they author actions. So, returning to Ross' (2007) view of human uniqueness, IMF helps constitute the neural control systems that are needed by the self. Motive formation brings coaction under control of cultural display that is partly regulated by what the infant expects.
The baby relies on its brain, caregiver dynamics and a group's normative patterns. As the infant becomes increasingly mindful, she gradually learns to manage coordinated display that, later, will include wordings. Eventually, human expression is found to be interpretatively terminal (Love, 2007). In contrast to a constructed code, certain segmental patterns (e.g. ba-by) are, in the child's world, already semantic. Given extensive experience of uttering related sounds, she may come to hear 'baby' as baby. In thus coming to hear a wording, more direct perceptions may be reorganised as a result of motivated action. Using compression based on cultural contingencies, aspects of the perceived world (e.g. of a sister) may become linked with a segmental percept. Repeated exposure thus compresses non-conceptual content.12 In coming to hear ba-by, therefore, she may draw on a non-conceptual category (certain aspects of what we call 'sister'). As this becomes a rudimentary concept, intrinsic motivation will prompt the baby to test out its uses. Many new forms of signalling become possible. For current purposes, it is of interest to look briefly at the crib-monologues (self-talk) sometimes produced by 3-4 year olds. Here is an example from a child known as Emily:
We bought a baby, cause, the well because, when she, well, we thought it was for Christmas, but when we went to the s-s-s store we didn't have our jacket on, but I saw some dolly, and I yelled at my mother and said I want one of those dolly. So after we finished with the store, we went over to the dolly and she bought me one. So I have one. (Nelson, 1996, p. 163)
Emily remembers what she said and how she acted. By conforming to English patterns, the language stance gives a perspective on 'what happened'. Once again, the necessary processes can change the baby's world. Since Emily now hears her own speaking (as shown by self-correction), she can learn from her utterances. In this passage, for example, she uses rudiments of logic ('So after we finished with the store ... we bought one.') While this could be deliberate, it is likely that mindless patterns make such patterns familiar long before they are either heard or put to strategic ends. Given working memory (also shown by repair), she not only hears verbal patterns but uses these to react to what she is saying ('well, we thought it was for Christmas'). Having gone beyond reliance on socially appropriate vocalizations (hearing segmental patterns) Emily may be motivated to vary her wordings to fit with her telling (and her feelings about self). While lacking space to pursue such issues, this suffices to provide a sketch of the developmental context.
Even one-year-olds exploit caregiver hearings of 'more', 'milk' or 'ta' in coaction. Hypothetically, analysis amenable behaviour arises from caregiver attributions that fill out incomplete information. Indeed, not only do they often react to benefit the child but, just as strikingly, adults may repeat what should have been said. This surely retrains working memory to hone in on discrete, distinct (segmental)
Coherent social action
Adaptor (Caregiver dynamics)
12 Broadly, this parallels Steels and Belpaeme's (2005) work on how robots detect colours. In the imitation game, 'correct' use of patterns is rewarded. Where linked with selection, robots come to compress non-conceptual content in more similar ways.
patterns. If so, we can sketch logical steps towards gaining control over speaking. First, a baby (1) makes use of vocalizations. Later, she (2) hears distinct segmental patterns. Once achieved, she can (3) begin to align them to the caregiver's view of discrete patterns. Given reactions, she will (4) discover (roughly) what they afford. Later, given tellings about the past, she will (5) learn that they can evoke (what we call) memories. Given the power of semantic synthesis, we might present steps 1-5 as consolidating coherent social action.
Given that caregiver dynamics shape infant motive formation Emily's behaviour may take on layered complexity (as Kravchenko (2007) suggests).
1. IMF (m) ^ M (the child develops a 2nd motivation system)
3. IMF (mMV) ^ Ve (IMF prompts vocalizations to become effective)
4. IMF (mMVVe) ^ Vt (IMF prompts effective vocalizations to become types)
5. IMF (mMVVeVt) ^ XX (IMF prompts vocalization about vocalization)
Caregiver dynamics prompt motive formation and, thus, increasingly context-sensitive behaviour. Expressive acts control the body in ways that, initially, sensitise to circumstances and later increases the child's control over events. In coming to narrate what happens, semantic syntheses can begin to tell self into existence. Given a history of sense-making, she can compress (non-conceptual) categories. In Ross' (2007) terms, she begins define her own meaning spaces. Using cultural norms, she partitions the world by among other things, drawing, on hearings of ba-by. Digitisation of semantics thus leads back to hearing aspects. Signalling alters motivation in ways that, hypothetically, prompt us to be self-narrative. The history of linguistic and metalinguistic expression contributes to how, as noted by Ross (2007), Dennett (1991a), and Bruner (2002), we tell selves into existence. In organic process terms, these are manufactured by artefacts that feature Emily's use of polyphony ('I yelled at my mother'). Surprisingly, perhaps, this supports Trevarthen's view that motive formation enables the rise of skills that shape awareness. Thus as narrative begins to influence what a child says, thinks and does, first-person impressions may change both working memory and how I hear who I am. Rather as in reviving a half-forgottten language, utterances gradually mutate into heard wordings that shape meaningful events. Given this sketch, we begin to extend Kravchenko's (2007) claim that language dynamics prompt us to hear linguistic signs. In development, the feeling of what happens may use digital signalling to consolidate itself into what we call linguistic experience (viz. hearing wordings).
As motivated expression shapes a consensual domain, we perceive in new ways. Above all, language assumes controlling functions. The process can be seen as one where motive formation prompts hearing in a particular sense. This suggests that, as babies come to believe in wordings, the consensual domain is increasingly influenced by expression. As wordings and meanings become familiar, social events are more routinely defined, evaluated, and interpreted around descriptions. As certain terms become familiar, we sensitise to counterfactuals. Even without a metalanguage for talking about talk, wordings come to seem word-based. Indeed, this kind of hearing readies us for actions - repeating, discussing, and challenging - that presuppose some kind of analysis. The expanded IMF (or self) thus uses circumstances to warp categories based in real-time expression. Simultaneously, cultural constraints serve to mark the (changing) limits of what can be said and done. By attending to the dynamics associated with organic coding, our vocal powers can emerge from using repetition to regularise both motivations and hearings. We take on trust that zot, red, or Albanian identify kinds. Even if the marks index normative patterns that shape a set of con-struals, we tend to reify their putative causes. We do this because, as children, we learned to act as if using words and, later, to use hearings in controlling and explaining social events (Cowley, 2007 b). Especially when we learned literacy skills, we picture language in terms of languages. Later, metalinguistic descriptions reinforce the language stance. We believe in imaginary codes (e.g. Albanian): we speak of words and languages as real. Even if we resist theories where brains represent such codes, such views influence our lives.
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